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Information markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome 
of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. They have the potential to improve 
decision making and policies throughout the economy. 
 
The demand for information markets appears to be increasing. At the same time, there are 
regulatory hurdles to establishing such markets, largely arising from state prohibitions on 
Internet gambling. This paper reviews the current regulatory structure for information markets in 
the United States and offers recommendations for reform. 
 
We make two points: first, the authority for regulating many information markets should 
be shifted from the states to the federal government. Second, the federal government should 
implement a clear policy that would allow a large number of information market contracts.  
 
We argue that that the Commodities Futures Trading Commission should regulate certain 
kinds of information market contracts that are futures contracts.  Particular contracts should 
satisfy an “economic purpose test” administered by the CFTC.  That test should consider 
whether an information market contract would allow for significant financial hedging or improve 
economic decisions. In addition, some types of information markets, such as over-the-counter 
markets, should remain exempt from CFTC regulation altogether.  We believe that the effect of 
our proposal would be to enhance the development of information markets that improve 
economic decision making.  
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Abstract Information markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the
outcome of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. They have the potential
to improve decision making and policies throughout the economy. At the same time, there
are regulatory hurdles to establish such markets, largely arising from state prohibitions on
Internet gambling. This paper reviews the current regulatory structure for information mar-
kets in the United States and offers recommendations for reform. We argue that the authority
for regulating many information markets should be shifted from the states to the federal
government. In addition, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission should administer
an “economic purpose test”. That test would only allow information market contracts that
are likely to provide signiﬁcant ﬁnancial hedging opportunities or valuable information for
improving economic decisions.
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1. Introduction
Information markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome of
an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. These markets go by a number of
names, including prediction markets, event markets and betting markets. Suppose a contract
pays $1 if Mr. Bush wins the presidential election, and the market price of a Bush contract
is currently 53cents. That means the market “believes” Mr. Bush has a 53% chance of win-
ning the election. This is a simple example of an information market that was pioneered by
professors at the University of Iowa in the late 1980s.1
Information markets have already been used in a variety of contexts. The most well-
known information markets are for small-stakes political contracts. Researchers at Iowa
conduct electronic markets for political futures contracts. Hewlett Packard has experimented
with information markets to forecast sales and Eli Lilly has used these markets to help pre-
dict successful drugs. TradeSports.com offers information contracts in a number of areas
including sports, politics, ﬁnance, law, entertainment and even the weather. Goldman Sachs
supports an over-the-counter (OTC) market called economicderivatives.com, which hosts
call auctions for contracts based on economic indices. There are currently more than 23 web
sites that offer information market contracts.2
Information markets have outperformed experts in a number of settings. For example,
Las Vegas odds and point spreads predict the outcomes of sporting events better than sports
experts.3 The prices in Iowa political markets are more accurate than the polls in forecasting
elections 451 out of 596times.4 Information markets at Hewlett-Packard Labs beat ofﬁcial
forecasts of printer sales 15 out of 16times.5 Even Hollywood play-money markets perform
better than 4 out of 5 columnists in predicting the Oscars.6
These markets work for several reasons: ﬁrst, almost anyone can participate; second, they
allowapersontoproﬁtfrombuyingcontractsthatforecastthefuture—buytherightpresiden-
tialcontractandyouwin,buythewrongoneandyoulose;third,theproﬁtmotiveencourages
people, including speculators, to look for better information all the time. So the market price
reﬂects a lot of information from diverse sources, resulting in what James Surowiecki calls
“The Wisdom of Crowds”.7
Several scholars have argued that information markets have widespread applications in
both the public sector and the private sector. Robin Hanson suggests that governments use
information markets to identify whether particular policies will improve national welfare.8
He also notes how they can be used for betting on the effect of ﬁring a corporation’s chief
1 See Gorham (2004). See also Iowa Electronic Markets (http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/about/).
2 For a listing of leading information markets, see: http://www.aei-brookings.org/policyfutures.
3 Foracomparisonofexperts,pollsandtheupdatedLasVegasbettinglineincollegeandprofessionalfootball
andbasketball,seehttp://tbeck.freeshell.org/.ForasurveyoftheefﬁciencyofLasVegassportsbettingmarkets
in general, see Sauer (1998).
4 See Joyce Berg, Forrest Nelson, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas Rietz (2003).
5 See Bingham (2003).
6 Plott (2000), Pennock, Nielsen and Giles (2001), Berg et al. (2003), Hanson (2003), Shiller (2003),
Abramowicz (2004), Pethokoukis (2004), Hahn and Tetlock (2004), and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004).
7 Surowiecki (2004).
8 Hanson (2003), at 14 (“The basic rule of government would be: When an approved betting market clearly
estimatesthataproposedpolicywouldincreaseexpectedGDP+,thatproposalbecomeslaw”.)Hansondeﬁnes
GDP+asameasureofnationalwelfarethatincorporatesnationalincomeandvaluessuchas“lifespan,leisure,
environmental assets, cultural prowess, and happiness”. Hanson recognizes that GDP may be an imperfect
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executiveonitsstockprice.9 CassSunsteinandJamesSurowieckisuggestusingthesemarkets
to improve upon decision-making in small groups.10 Michael Abramowicz points out ways
these markets can improve cost-beneﬁt analysis, and we suggest how information markets
can be used to implement more efﬁcient policies.11
In2003,informationmarketsreceivedsomeunintentionalbadpublicitywhensomepoliti-
cians criticized a proposal to introduce a government-sponsored Policy Analysis Market that
could provide information on possible events in the Middle East. These markets, which were
supported by a unit in the Department of Defense and some academics, never saw the light
of day because of the political ﬁrestorm.12 However, there are private information markets
that exist today related to Osama bin Laden’s capture and other events of interest.13
Informationmarketsarebecomingmorepopular.DespitethedemiseofthePolicyAnalysis
Market, interest in information markets has grown in recent years. Securities ﬁrms such as
Goldman Sachs have hosted markets that issue products that are not regulated by the Com-
moditiesFuturesTradingCommission(CFTC)becauseofanexemptionforover-the-counter
markets.14 In 2004, the CFTC began to regulate contracts listed by HedgeStreet.com, an
exchange that allows members to trade information market contracts based on future prices
of commodities like gasoline and real estate.15 The CFTC also regulates weather derivatives,
which are information market contracts listed on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.16 There
is also interest in betting on entertainment events using play money and real money.17
The regulation of information markets is likely to have a critical impact on their gro-
wth as well as the location of these operations. For example, one possible reason why
9 Hanson (2003).
10 See Sunstein (2004) and Surowiecki (2004). They caution against “groupthink”, which suggests that small
groups tend toward uniformity and censorship and often fail to use all available information in their decisions.
11 See Hahn and Tetlock (2004).
12 See Wallsten (2003).
13 See Tradesports.com, at http://www.tradesports.com/jsp/intrade/contractSearch/. The current bid price, as
of Sept. 28, is $1.81 for a payoff of $10 if Osama bin Laden is captured by Dec. 31, 2004.
14 See infra §4 for an explanation of over-the-counter markets. The Goldman Sachs Economic Derivatives
Market (http://www.gs.com/econderivs) makes it possible to buy and sell options on economic data releases
such as employment, retail sales, industrial production, inﬂation, consumer sentiment and economic growth
in order to hedge and initiate portfolio risk.
15 In February 2004, the CFTC allowed HedgeStreet.com to set up information market contracts and claimed
regulatory jurisdiction over them, as long as the contracts complied with the Commodity Exchange Act and
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act. Acworth (2004). With HedgeStreet, online investors can trade
contracts “based on economic risks in their daily lives-like the price of gas, changes in real estate values and
the rise or fall of interest rates” HedgeStreet (2004). HedgeStreet’s market lists a wide array of contracts,
called “hedgelets,” which are all binary contracts (they pay $10 if a speciﬁc outcome occurs and $0 if it does
not). Anyone can apply to become a member and, if their application is accepted, they must place a minimum
of $500 in their account to be able to begin buying and trading contracts. See www.hedgestreet.com. For
examples of information market contracts traded on Hedgestreet.com and subject to the CFTC’s oversight,
see http://www.cftc.gov/dea/deacertif.htm.
16 Weather derivatives include contracts on temperatures in various cities during particular seasons. For a list
of weather derivatives regulated by the CFTC, see the CFTC’s Annual Report 2003. State insurance commis-
sions argue that these weather derivatives should fall under their regulatory jurisdiction instead of the CFTC’s.
In a recent white paper, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) maintain that some
informationmarketcontracts,suchasweatherderivatives,shouldbereclassiﬁedfromcapitalmarketsproducts
to insurance products. See National Association of Insurance Commissioners (2003).
17 See Cherry (2003): “A U.S. government betting pool for future terrorism events is gone, but predictive
markets are here to stay.” See Hollywood Stock Exchange, available at www.hsx.com. For a website on which
one can bet on the popularity of Hollywood celebrities using play money, see Celebdaq on the BBC, available
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TradeSports.com located outside of the United States is because of U.S. laws and regu-
lations that restrict the use of information markets.18 Currently, there is no clear policy for
addressing information markets at the federal level. At the state level, these markets are
generally governed by laws and regulations on Internet gambling.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the current regulatory structure for information
markets and suggest changes that could enhance efﬁciency. We make two points: ﬁrst, the
authority for regulating many information markets should be shifted from the states to the
federal government. Second, the federal government should have a clear policy on whether
certain information markets are allowed. Speciﬁcally, we argue that the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission should preempt federal and state regulation of certain kinds of infor-
mation market contracts that can be considered futures contracts,19 and that these contracts
should be regulated as futures contracts—so that the costs of listing certain information mar-
ket contracts is modest.20 We also suggest that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
should administer an “economic purpose test” to determine whether speciﬁc information
market contracts would yield positive social outcomes. We believe that the effect of our
proposal would be to enhance the development of information markets that could improve
decision making and efﬁciency throughout the economy.21
Section 2 reviews the rationale for regulating gambling. Section 3 reviews current reg-
ulations that could apply to information markets. Section 4 presents a proposal for placing
the oversight responsibilities for certain kinds of information markets with the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission. Section 5 concludes.
2. Why regulate information markets?
The economic rationale for regulating information markets is that they are a type of betting
market that could have undesirable side effects. In this section, we provide a brief overview
of the economic rationale for regulating gambling, and Internet gambling in particular. We
ﬁnd that there are good reasons for regulating gambling, but that many types of information
markets should not be construed as gambling.22 Many scholars suggest that several forms of
gambling, including bets via the Internet, should be regulated.23 They raise concerns about
youth gambling, gambling addiction, and the potential of gambling to increase crime. One
18 See infra §3 for a description of the current U.S. regulatory structure, which stiﬂes the creation of infor-
mation markets in the United States.
19 See infra §4 for an economic deﬁnition of a futures contract and legal criteria that the CFTC uses to deter-
mine whether a contract is a futures contract and falls within its regulatory jurisdiction. Information market
contracts can be deﬁned analogously to index futures already regulated by the CFTC, such as weather futures.
For an index futures contract measuring President Bush’s vote share in the 2004 election, the index would be
the percentage of the popular vote the President received according to the ofﬁcial Secretary of State records
on November 16, 2004. A purchaser of the Bush vote share futures contract would pay the current price of the
contract in order to receive the value of the index at the settlement date. This contractual structure is exactly
analogous to the structure of weather futures contracts that are allowed by the CFTC.
20 The CFTC has not yet provided policy guidance for information markets.
21 For early contributions on the value of information, see Blackwell (1953); Hirshleifer (1971); and Raiffa
(1968).
22 Whilesomeinformationmarkets,suchaswageringonsportsoutcomesovertheInternet,canbeconsidered
Internet gambling, other types of information markets serve a useful economic purpose. We argue that such
markets should not be lumped together with gambling.
23 See, for example, Winters, Stinchﬁeld, and Kim (1995), Kezwer (1996), American Academy of Pediatrics
(1998), and Shaffer and Hall (2002).J Regul Econ (2006) 29:265–281 269
of the concerns about Internet gambling is that it may attract youth. The Internet can be used
anonymously,creatingadangerthatyouthscanaccessInternetgamblingsites.Youngpeople
may be attracted to on-line sports wagering, tournaments and sweepstakes.24
Asecondproblemarisesfromgamblingaddiction,whichisoneofthereasonsthatgroups
like Gamblers Anonymous have formed.25 High levels of privacy and easy access offered
by Internet gambling may exacerbate problems with pathological gambling.26 Dr. Howard
Shaffer of Harvard Medical School writes, “As smoking crack cocaine changed the cocaine
experience, I think electronics is going to change the way gambling is experienced”.27
A third problem arises because of concerns with crime. Some concerns have been raised
about credit card fraud or general fraud.28 Other concerns have been raised about organized
crime using this vehicle as a way to increase its reach. For example, online casino operators
could easily alter or remove their websites at a moment’s notice, and they or other hackers
could manipulate software in order to alter the odds of winning. Online gambling could also
be used as a means by which to launder money.29 Those addicted to gambling may be par-
ticularly vulnerable to gambling ﬁrms that extend credit to people with limited abilities to
pay. Gambling addicts may ﬁnd ways to pay that result in increases in crime, such as theft
and robbery. These illegal activities may provide a rationale for government intervention. At
this point, there is not much data on the potential size of the problem. There are some data,
however, suggesting the size of the Internet gambling market has grown dramatically, from
about $1 billion in 1999 to almost $6billion in 2003.30 In addition, nearly half of online bets
are placed by people in the U.S.31
Overall,althoughsomeformsofgamblingmaybeharmfulandcostly,manytypesofinfor-
mation markets will offer beneﬁts that greatly outweigh their costs. Policy makers should
attempt to distinguish between information markets that may encourage gambling and those
that serve a useful economic purpose.32
3. The current regulatory structure
The current regulatory structure for information markets is governed, in part, by state laws
regulating Internet gambling, as well as federal law. A recent paper by Gorham and Biswall
suggeststhatthereareﬁvewaystoallowU.S.consumerstoparticipatelegallyininformation
markets. One is to obtain a no-action letter from the CFTC, as the Iowa Electronic Markets
24 See Janower (1996).
25 Formed in 1957, Gambler’s Anonymous holds support meetings in the U.S. and over 35 other nations. For
more information, see http://www.gamblersanonymous.org/.
26 See Saum (1999).
27 Dr. Howard Shaffer, director of the Harvard Medical School’s Division on Addiction Studies, quoted by
Kindt (2001).
28 See National Gambling Impact Study Commission (1999). See also Mussington, Wilson, and Molander
(1998).
29 See Franklin (2001) and Leach (2000).
30 According to Christiansen Capital Advisors LLC, the size of the online gambling industry—in terms of
annual revenue of online operators—has grown between 1999 and 2003, from $1.2 billion to $5.7 billion.
31 Richtel (2004a).
32 In practice, there is no simple way to know a person’s motives for trading in a market. Gambling could
occur in a large number of markets, including stock markets. For example, the phenomenon of day-trading
could be construed as gambling. Our point is that when a market arguably serves a broader economic purpose,
there should be a presumption in favor of allowing exchange to occur.270 J Regul Econ (2006) 29:265–281
did. A second is to list the product on a futures exchange. A third is to list an excluded prod-
uct, and have it traded by sophisticated parties. A fourth is to comply with the myriad state
regulations on gaming; and a ﬁfth is to set up business offshore, but to allow U.S. customers
to participate.33
Many states have issued regulations that prohibit Internet gambling. Six states have pro-
hibited it, and at least seven have introduced legislation to prohibit it. Louisiana, Texas,
Illinois, Nevada, Oregon, and South Dakota have banned Internet gambling.34 Other states,
such as New Jersey, New York, and California, have introduced legislation to prohibit Inter-
net gambling. In states that have not expressly prohibited Internet gambling, existing state
gambling laws could apply. In Utah, for example, Internet gambling would be illegal since
all types of gambling are illegal in the state.35
Because of difﬁculties in regulating Internet gambling at the state level, some groups now
see the federal government as their only hope for effective regulation. The National Associa-
tion of State Attorneys General, for example, has asked the federal government to expand its
“anti-wagering” statutes to prohibit Internet gambling.36 The primary federal law governing
Internet gambling is the Federal Wire Act of 1961.37 This law makes it illegal to use “wire
communications” to place or assist with placing bets or wagers. Yet, it is ambiguous on
several fronts. For example, does “wire communications” include the Internet? Do “sports
wagering” and “contests” include all types of gambling on the Internet?38
The act also has two major loopholes. First, it applies only to those “engaged in the busi-
ness of betting or wagering,” and therefore cannot be used to prosecute bettors.39 Second,
the Act does not apply to cases in which Internet gambling is allowed in both the state from
which a bet was transmitted and the state in which it was received.40 Despite the loopholes
33 SeeGorhamandBiswall(2005)foranexcellentoverviewofthisissue.Asnotedbelow,settingupbusiness
offshore could be a problem if, say, the Justice Department determines the entity is violating the Federal Wire
Act.
34 Illinois,forexample,“prohibitsanyindividualorﬁnancialinstitutionfrommakingawiretransferofmoney
for internet-based gambling” and voids all “credit card debts that result from internet-based gambling.” See
Ill. Compiled Statutes 720 ILCS 5/28-2. Louisiana ﬁnes internet gambling businesses “no more than $20,000”
and bettors “no more than $500.” See 1997 La. Act 1467 S.4. See also S. 318, Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1997). S. 1222,
76th Leg. Reg. Sees. (Texas, 1999).
35 See Utah Constitution, Article VI, Legislative Dept. S 27: “The Legislature shall not authorize any game
of chance, lottery, or gift enterprises under any pretense or for any purpose.”
36 Florida Attorney General Butterworth wrote his congressman, Steven Gellar: “State law prohibits an indi-
vidualinFloridafromplacingabetorwagerbywirecommunicationorbyuseoftheInternetandthedifﬁculty
in adopting and implementing durable and effective enforcement mechanisms, makes any effort to regulate
the Internet’s use better suited to federal legislation, rather than a patchwork attempt by individual states”
(United States Senate Republican Policy Committee 2003).
37 TheFederalWireActstatesthat:“Whoeverbeingengagedinthebusinessofbettingorwageringknowingly
uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission
of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers,
or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be ﬁned under this title or imprisoned not
more than 2 years, or both”. See 18 U.S.C § 1084.
38 See 18 U.S.C § 1084.
39 See 18 U.S.C § 1084.
40 See 18 U.S.C § 1084: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in interstate
or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the trans-
mission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or
foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country in which
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and ambiguities in the federal law, the Department of Justice has investigated and brought
charges against at least 20 Internet gambling operators on charges of violating the Federal
Wire Act.41 Although all the defendants operated their businesses offshore and maintained
that they were licensed by foreign governments, they were U.S. citizens at the time of their
arrests and subject to U.S. law.
TherearecurrentlyeffortsinCongresstostrengthenFederalregulationandprohibitInter-
net gambling nationally. In March 2003, Senators Kyl, Shelby, and Feinstein introduced the
Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act, which would prohibit banks and other
ﬁnancialinstitutionsfromprocessingInternetgamblingtransactions.42 Sincetheintroduction
of this act, much Internet gambling activity has moved overseas and offshore.43
TheDepartmentofJusticehastakennoteofthemoveoverseas,andisbeginningtoaddress
international Internet gambling. Since 2003, the DOJ has been investigating American com-
panies that provide services to offshore gambling sites. Federal prosecutors have pressured
American companies to stop providing these services. For example, Google, Yahoo, and
Lycos stopped advertising online gambling sites in April 2004 after signiﬁcant pressure
from federal prosecutors.44 Furthermore, many American credit card companies—including
CitigroupInc.,asof2002—nolongerallowcreditcardstheyissuetobeusedforInternetbet-
ting.45 There are also cases in which the U.S. government has seized money from companies
for “aiding and abetting” online gambling operators.46
In July 2003, Antigua and Barbuda, a Caribbean island nation with a population of only
68,000, took a dispute to the World Trade Organization condemning U.S. restrictions on
online gambling. U.S. representatives responded by saying: “These services (online gam-
bling) present psychological dangers to some segments of society, as well as create serious
social problems and law enforcement difﬁculties”.47 On March 24, 2004, the WTO issued a
decision that the U.S. prohibition on Internet gambling is in violation of U.S. free trade obli-
gations.48 The response of the U.S. Trade Representative’s ofﬁce was resolute: “We intend
to appeal and will argue vigorously that this deeply ﬂawed panel report must be corrected by
the appellate body”.49
In general, both federal and state laws do not appear to have been very effective at curb-
ing gambling. One of the problems is that Internet gambling crosses state and national
41 One recent prosecution involved Jay Cohen Feb. 8, 2000: Jay Cohen was convicted of violating the Wire
Wage Act by operating an offshore Antigua-based sports betting business (World Sports Exchange) that
illegally accepted bets and wagers from Americans over the Internet and telephones. He was the ﬁrst defen-
dant to stand trial in a series of Internet offshore gambling cases that were the ﬁrst prosecutions brought
under the Wire Act. Ten defendants had previously pled guilty. Cohen was sentenced to 21months in prison,
followed by 2years of supervised release, and was assessed nearly $6,000 in ﬁnes. See Department of
Justice (2000).
42 See United States Senate Republican Policy Committee (2003).
43 In many other countries, online gambling is unambiguously legal (for example, in Great Britain, Ireland,
CostaRica,Antigua andBarbuda,Belize, andAustralia). Furthermore,American operatorsofoverseasonline
casinos “could face arrest if they entered the United States” Richtel (2004a).
44 See, for example, Richtel (2004a) and Richtel (2004b).
45 Giles (2004).
46 For example, PayPal—an online payment service—had to forfeit $10million in 2003 for processing gam-
bling transactions. See McCullagh (2003).
47 Giles (2004).
48 Richtel (2004b) and Giles (2004).
49 CBS News.com (2004).272 J Regul Econ (2006) 29:265–281
boundaries.50 To the extent that these laws are effective, however, they impede the develop-
ment of information markets that have the potential to yield signiﬁcant beneﬁts for society.
4. A proposal for regulating information markets
There are many possibilities for regulating information markets. These include the status
quo, using contract law at the state level, and having the CFTC play a larger role. The status
quo is a patchwork quilt of regulation and law that is likely to discourage the emergence
of useful information markets. We think contract law is problematic because unregulated
securities markets may experience more serious adverse selection and information asymme-
try problems.51 We think it is reasonable for the CFTC to provide exemptions for selected
markets, and for the agency to specify information market contracts that would fall under its
jurisdiction. We believe that the latter two options are superior to the status quo, or relying
on the law of contracts.52 As an alternative, we suggest an approach to regulating informa-
tion market contracts consisting of four parts: the CFTC should be the primary agency with
regulatory jurisdiction over information market contracts;53 there should be a requirement
thatallinformationmarketcontractsunderCFTCjurisdictionpassaneconomicpurposetest;
regulation and law should grant exemptions for appropriate categories of information market
contracts; and regulation should rely primarily on self-certiﬁcation of contracts.
Wethink theCFTCshouldbetheprimaryagencyinvolvedinregulating information mar-
ketcontractsforanumberofreasons.54 First,itisalreadychargedwithregulatingfuturesand
options contracts, and information market contracts could be thought of as a type of futures
contract.55 A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell a product at a pre-speciﬁed price
50 See National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report (1999). (“The large majority of Internet
gambling sites, along with their owners and operators, are beyond the reach of the state attorneys general.
The difﬁculty state governments face in regulating or prohibiting Internet gambling has been made clear in
disputes regarding sites owned by Native American tribal governments…Currently, governments in 25 coun-
tries license or have passed legislation to permit Internet gambling operations. To effectively prohibit Internet
gambling, the U.S. government would have to ensure that these licensed operators do not offer their services
within U.S. borders, a proposition that poses a range of unanswered questions regarding feasibility”.)
51 On adverse selection, see Glosten and Milgrom (1985). For a view that supports contract law, see Bell
(2002). For an insightful analysis of security market regulation, see Black (2001).
52 Wealsobelievethatsomeregulationisneedednow,particularlyifcertaininformationmarketshaveharmful
socialsideeffectssimilartothoseassociatedwithgambling.Absentsuchsideeffects,thecaseforregulationis
considerably weakened,thoughtherestill may bea roleforregulatinginformation marketsasfuturesmarkets,
which fall under the purview of the CFTC. We are sensitive to concerns, however, that the CFTC may regulate
in ways that are not socially optimal. Nonetheless, we believe that such regulation, particularly if done with
a light touch, is preferable to the current patchwork quilt of state and federal regulation that confronts ﬁrms
now, and which we believe is highly inefﬁcient. We also believe that there may be merits to allowing states to
experiment. For a discussion of some of the general trade-offs involved see Inman and Rubinfeld (1997).
53 We suggest the CFTC, as opposed to another federal agency, because the CFTC is already regulating some
information market contracts. Moreover, in terms of its legislative mandate to regulate futures contracts, the
agency appears to be the most appropriate ﬁt. Another possibility at the federal level is the Securities and
Exchange Commission. We do not think a separate regulatory agency is needed to address this issue.
54 We believe this is within the CFTC’s power based on discussions with CFTC lawyers and Michael Gor-
ham. We recognize, however, there may be differences of opinion here. At the same time, it can be argued that
administrative agencies have quite a bit of discretion under the Chevron doctrine, which is especially relevant
when older legal language is applied to new situations or technologies that may not have been contemplated
in the statute.
55 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, About the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, avail-
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for delivery at some point in the future.56 It could be a contract that pays $ x if the value of
the Dow Jones Index is x points, or a contract that pays $ x if President Bush wins x%o ft h e
popular vote in the 2004 election. In our opinion, virtually all information market contracts
are futures contracts, at least using a standard economic deﬁnition of such contracts.
Second, the CFTC has expertise in regulating such markets.57 The CFTC already regu-
lates a number of contracts that we would call information market contracts. As recently as
February of 2004, the CFTC designated HedgeStreet as a futures contract market that com-
plies with the Commodity Exchange Act.58 HedgeStreet enables online trading of economic
eventsandindicesrelevanttoeverydaylife,includingcurrencies,commodities,interestrates,
inﬂation, mortgage rates, and employment.59 Weather derivative contracts on temperatures
in various cities are another example of information markets that the CFTC regulates.60
Third, it appears that several information market contracts would satisfy the legal criteria
that the CFTC applies to a futures contract, and thus, these contracts could fall under the
CFTC’s jurisdiction. Indeed, most of the information market contracts that pass an economic
purpose test would comply with the statutes governing futures contracts and satisfy various
CFTC guidelines for determining CFTC jurisdiction.61
as binary or regular options contracts, both of which are regulated by the CFTC. An example of a binary
contract is a contract that yields a ﬁxed payment only if the price of gasoline is less than $1.90 per gallon on
a future date. This contract is currently traded on HedgeStreet.
56 For an economic deﬁnition of a futures contract, see Sharpe (1985) (“Whenever something is ordered
instead of purchased on the spot, a forward or future contract is involved. The price is decided at the time the
order is placed, but the cash is exchanged for merchandise later…Futures contracts (futures for short) provide
astandardizedmeansofengaginginsuchtransactionsforagriculturalandothercommoditiesandforﬁnancial
instruments and stock indices”.)
57 In2003,theCFTCwashadabudgetof$85.4millionand526full-timeemployeestosupportthreestrategic
goals: (1) protect the economic functions of the commodity futures and options markets; (2) protect market
usersandthepublic;(3)fosteropen,competitive,andﬁnanciallysoundmarkets.SeeCommodityFuturesTrad-
ing Commission, FY 2003 Annual Performance Report, available at http://www.cftc.gov/cftc/cftcreports.htm.
In 2004, the CFTC was appropriated $89.9million to support these three goals. See Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission, FY 2005 President’s Budget and Performance Plan, available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ﬁles/ofm/ofm2005pb.pdf.
58 The HedgeStreet application is available on the CFTC website at http://www.cftc.gov/dea/
deadcms_table.htm. The Division of Market Oversight at the CFTC determined that HedgeStreet’s appli-
cationdemonstrated compliance withthe designationcriteria ofSection 5(b)oftheCommodityExchangeAct
(“Act”), the core principles of Section 5(d) of the Act, and the common provisions of Section 5c(b) of the Act
regarding designation of contract markets. See also “Street Sleuth: Firm Offers Hedging on a Small Scale,”
Wall Street Journal, Oct. 22, 2004.
59 See www.hedgestreet.com. See also The Iowa Electronic Markets, available at http://www.biz.uiowa.
edu/iem/, which received a no-action letter from the CFTC, meaning that the CFTC ofﬁce or division issuing
the letter would not recommend enforcement action against the market.
60 For a list of weather derivatives regulated by the CFTC, see the CFTC’s Annual Report 2003.
61 See CFTC Guideline No. 1, Interpretive Statement Regarding Economic and Public Interest Requirements
for Listing Contracts: (“A board of trade shall submit: A demonstration that the terms and conditions, as a
whole, will result in a deliverable supply such that the contract will not be conducive to price manipulation
or distortion and that the deliverable supply reasonably can be expected to be available to short traders and
salable by long traders at its market value in normal cash marketing channels”. (4)…additional evidence,
information or data relating to whether the contract meets, initially or on a continuing basis, any of the speciﬁc
requirementsoftheAct,includingthepublicintereststandardcontainedinSection5(7)oftheActandwhether
the contract reasonably can be expected to be, or has been, used for hedging and/or price basing on more than
an occasional basis”.) Under the CFTC’s criteria, it appears that many information markets would be futures
contracts.274 J Regul Econ (2006) 29:265–281
A basic problem arises in regulation because Congress did not intend for the CFTC to
be a gaming or gambling commission.62 Thus, Congress or the agency needs to distinguish
between information market contracts with a broad economic purpose and gambling.63 We
suggest using an “economic purpose test”, which the CFTC could administer to determine
whether an information market contract would yield positive social outcomes. To pass our
economic purpose test, an information contract would need to satisfy at least one of two
criteria. The ﬁrst criterion is that the information market contract is likely to provide signiﬁ-
cant ﬁnancial hedging opportunities; and the second criterion is that the prevailing price of
the information market contract is likely to provide valuable information for improving eco-
nomic decisions.64 Our proposed economic purpose test would require that an information
market contract be used for ﬁnancial hedging, or have some reasonable chance of improving
economic decision making, or both.65 The ﬁrst criterion mirrors the hedging requirement in
the Commodity and Futures Modernization Act. The second criterion is a logical extension
of the price discovery and price information requirements. These requirements are designed
to aid in planning and risk management.
Farming provides a good example of how information markets could serve similar func-
tions to traditional textbook futures markets. Just as farmers would like to know the price of
wheat in advance of the harvest, they would also like to know the likelihood that bad weather
will endanger their yields. Similarly, farmers that want to hedge against the risk that lower
wheatpriceswillreducetheirproﬁtsmayalsowanttohedgeagainsttheriskthatbadweather
will decrease proﬁts.
The CFTC will not always ﬁnd it easy to determine whether an information market con-
tract satisﬁes our economic purpose test. In the beginning, the CFTC may need to evaluate
information market contracts on a case-by-case basis. Over time, it should be able to provide
guidance on general categories of contracts that are acceptable. Table 1 reviews some stan-
dard categories of contracts from TradeSports.com, and provides our assessment of whether
the CFTC should regulate them as futures contracts.
In general, we would suggest that information market contracts for sporting events, such
as selecting the winner of a baseball game, should not be subject to CFTC oversight. For
legalpurposes,thesecontractsshouldbeconsideredgambling.Atthesametime,somesports
information markets could be quite useful. For example, Washington, D.C. is considering
whether to host a baseball team and build a new stadium. An information market related to
the economic impact of this stadium could provide very useful economic information for
local business people. The ﬁrst criterion in the article emphasizes ﬁnancial hedging oppor-
tunities to distinguish information market contracts from sports contracts that may provide
62 The futures industry has historically attempted to distinguish the contracts they offer from pure gambling.
The industry maintains that its contracts serve a valuable economic purpose, such as hedging. See Futures
Industry Association (2004).
63 For a discussion of the difference between futures markets and gambling, see Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (2004): “Many people think that futures markets are just about speculating or ‘gambling’. While
it is true that futures markets can be used for speculating, that is not the primary reason for their existence.
Futures markets are actually designed as vehicles for hedging and risk management, that is, to help people
avoid ‘gambling’ when they don’t want to.”
64 Here, we interpret economic decisions broadly to include both efﬁciency and equity decisions.
65 We would not require an exchange to guarantee a liquid market for contracts. Instead, we would allow
private exchanges and private agents to make decisions about which markets would be liquid. Although the
CFTC could regulate the degree of liquidity provided, this would be a departure from the current norms
regarding regulation of futures contracts. Furthermore, such a regulation would only make economic sense if
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purelypsychologicalhedgingopportunities—e.g.,bettingagainstone’sfavoriteteam.Deﬁn-
ing information market contracts based on objective ﬁnancial criteria reduces the need for
conceptually difﬁcult judgments. The CFTC currently administers a kind of public-interest
test similar to the economic purpose test to determine whether futures contracts fall under its
jurisdiction and are acceptable.66 The Commodity and Futures Modernization Act requires
that a contract be used for hedging, price discovery, or dissemination of pricing information.
If the CFTC ﬁnds that an information market contract is a futures contract as deﬁned in
the Commodity Exchange Act and satisﬁes the economic purpose test, then it could preempt
otherstateandfederalregulatoryauthorities.67 Byreducinguncertainty,webelievethatsuch
preemption would help stimulate innovation in information markets.
A key feature of our regulatory approach is to allow for broad exemptions. Where traders
are likely to be well-informed, there is little reason to regulate information market contracts.
This is probably true, for example, in markets where the minimum amount to participate
in the market is signiﬁcant, and where only large institutions or high net-worth individuals
can trade.68 We would suggest exempting such markets from regulation, provided that the
contracts traded in those markets pass an economic purpose test.69
Another possible exemption that we would recommend is for over-the-counter informa-
tion markets. One example is economicderivatives.com, which is run by Goldman Sachs.70
Trades in over-the-counter contracts do not occur on exchanges and are exempt from CFTC
regulation.71
66 The Commodity and Futures Modernization Act amended the Commodity Exchange Act, Section 5(7)
to read: “Sec. 108: Protection of the Public Interest…(a)Findings.—The transactions subject to this Act are
entered into regularly in interstate and international commerce and are affected with a national public interest
by providing a means for managing and assuming price risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing
information through trading in liquid, fair, and ﬁnancially secure trading facilities. (b) Purpose. —It is the
purpose of this Act to serve the public interests described in subsection (a) through a system of self-regulation
of trading facilities, clearing systems, market participants and market professionals under the oversight of the
Commission. To foster these public interests, it is further the purpose of this Act to deter and prevent price
manipulation or any other disruptions to market integrity”.) See also CFTC Guidelines, Appendix A to Part
40, CFTC Guideline No. 1 (The CFTC requires that the board of trade submit the following: “(4)…additional
evidence, information or data relating to whether the contract meets, initially or on a continuing basis, any of
the speciﬁc requirements of the Act, including the public interest standard contained in Section 5(7) of the Act
and whether the contract reasonably can be expected to be, or has been, used for hedging and/or price basing
on more than an occasional basis”.)
67 SeeSec.117,(e)2AofCommodityExchangeAct,“Preemption”:“ThisActshallsupersedeandpreemptthe
application of any State or local law that prohibits or regulates gaming or the operation of bucket shops (other
than antifraud provisions of general application) in the case of—(A) an electronic trading facility excluded
under section 2(e) of the Act. See also Sec. 210 (28) (2) of the Commodity Exchange Act, “Preemption of
State Laws,” stating: “No provision of State law regarding the offer, sale, or distribution of securities shall
apply to any transaction in a securities futures product…” If a contract fails the economic purpose test, then
it would need to deal with the state gaming commissions.
68 For criteria allowing a board of trade to operate as an exempt board of trade, see Commodity Exchange
Act, §5 (d): Exempt Boards of Trade. One of the criteria is that only “eligible contract participants” can enter
into a contract. “Eligible contract participants” include large institutions or high net-worth individuals. For a
deﬁnition of “eligible contract participant,” see Commodity Exchange Act, §1(a)(12).
69 The public interest standards in the statute and CFTC guidelines do not appear to apply to exemptions. We
think that it is also reasonable to have an economic purpose test for exemptions.
70 See the Goldman Sachs Economic Derivatives Market (http://www.gs.com/econderivs). This market is
over-the-counter, which means that it does not trade on a formal exchange. The Commodity Futures Modern-
ization Act of 2000 exempts all OTC derivatives from CFTC regulation.
71 See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. For a deﬁnition of over-the-counter markets, see
the CFTC Glossary, available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/glossary/opaglossary_o.htm#overthecounter (“The
trading of commodities, contracts, or other instruments not listed on any exchange. OTC transactions canJ Regul Econ (2006) 29:265–281 277
A third possible exemption that the CFTC may want to allow is for markets that limit the
size of investments, as in the Iowa Electronic Markets.72 There, starting accounts require a
minimum of $5 and a maximum of $500 per participant.73 The CFTC market may also want
to provide exemptions for contracts whose overall volume or revenues does not exceed a
certain amount. Such exemptions would allow exchanges, such as the one in Iowa, to exper-
iment freely with new contract designs without risking serious economic harm to market
participants.74 Finally, if an information market contract passes the economic purpose test,
but is not exempt, the CFTC should regulate it as a futures contract. Currently, exchanges are
allowed to self-certify futures contracts, meaning that an exchange does not have to get the
CFTC’s approval before listing a contract.75 The terms of regulation should not be any more
onerous than other comparable instruments, such as futures contracts. Thus, ﬁrms should
be allowed to self-certify information market contracts. Keeping the costs of regulation low
will promote innovation. If ﬁrms wish to gain formal CFTC approval for their information
market contracts, they should be allowed to do so.76
We would also suggest that information markets that are susceptible to manipulation by
a small number of people should not be regulated as futures contracts by the CFTC.77 The
presence of a few manipulated information markets could damage the credibility of all infor-
mation markets similar to the presence of insider trading activity. Moreover, it is unclear that
the prices in thin, manipulated markets would produce useful information or allow signiﬁ-
cantﬁnancialhedgingopportunities.Untilfurtherresearchestablishesthebeneﬁtsofmarkets
susceptible to manipulation, it does not make sense to regulate them as futures contracts.78
Occurrences that cannot be or are unlikely to be inﬂuenced by human intervention, such as
the weather or CPI, are less susceptible to manipulation. Sporting event contracts, however,
are more susceptible to manipulation.
occur electronically or over the telephone”.) See also William Sharpe, Investments (3rd ed.): “Most bonds are
sold over-the-counter, as are mutual funds, many bank and ﬁnance stocks, and the securities of small (and
some not-so-small) companies”. See the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 Chap. 2, Sect. 408
(2)(c), which exempts over-the-counter markets from CFTC regulation.
72 Markets,suchasthoseforsportingeventoutcomes,thatdonotmeettheinformationmarketcriteriaoutlined
above would not qualify for this exemption.
73 Glasner (2002).
74 Another alternative might be to allow exemptions for research by academics at not-for-proﬁt institutions,
such as was done in the case of the Iowa Electronic Market. We would prefer to have an exemption that is
broader than this, such as one that puts limits on the amount of money that can be spent by an individual. That
way, people who are interested in doing research or experimenting in the for-proﬁt world could do so.
75 The overwhelming majority of all contracts now regulated by the CFTC are self-certiﬁed. However, the
CFTC can ﬁle a lawsuit against an exchange that lists a contract that violates the Commodity Exchange Act.
See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Sec. 5c(c), New Contracts, New Rules, and Rule Amend-
ments for the self-certiﬁcation clause: “…a registered entity may elect to list for trading or accept for clearing
any new contract or other instrument, or may elect to approve and implement any new rule or rule amendment,
by providing to the Commission…a written certiﬁcation that the new contract or instrument or clearing of the
new contract or instrument, new rule, or rule amendment complies with this Act (including regulations under
this Act).”
76 SeeCodeofFederalRegulations,Chapter1–CommodityandFuturesTradingCommission,Part40,§40.3:
“Voluntary submission of new products for Commission review and approval”: “(a) Request for approval. A
designated contract market or registered derivatives transaction execution facility may request under section
5c(c)(2) of the Act that the Commission approve new products…”
77 Critics of the Policy Analysis Market in terrorism futures argued that a small group of terrorists could
determine the outcome of the information market, and thus proﬁt ﬁnancially.
78 A number of authors have suggested that information markets be considered in small groups. See, e.g.,
Cass Sunstein, “Deliberation and Information Markets,” in Hahn and Tetlock, eds. (2005, forthcoming). See
also Surowiecki (2004).278 J Regul Econ (2006) 29:265–281
The same type of insider trading rules for stock options and futures contracts should also
apply to information market contracts. Currently, futures contracts susceptible to manipula-
tion and insider trading are jointly regulated by the CFTC and the SEC. The CFTC regulates
futurescontractsthatarebasedonbroad-basedindices,suchasunemployment,interestrates,
and the price of corn.79 The SEC and CFTC jointly regulate futures contracts that are based
a single-stock or narrow-based index.80 We support the same types of restrictions on insider
dealings in information markets. We suggest that the SEC also help the CFTC with policing
information markets, just as it helps with the regulation of narrow-based security futures
contracts.
There could be an exemption from insider trading restrictions for markets internal to an
organization (such as a ﬁrm), especially markets that only use money granted by the organi-
zation to its members. For markets in which both insiders and outsiders participate, normal
insidertradinglawswouldapplyforthesamereasonsthatsecuritiesmarketshavetheselaws.
Although it is an interesting question whether any securities market should have insider trad-
ing restrictions, this question lies beyond the scope of our paper. If our proposed regulatory
ﬁx for information markets were not viewed as legal, Congress could provide more explicit
guidance on the type of markets it wants the CFTC to regulate.81 We do not think this guid-
ance is necessary for information markets, but we are not legal experts.82 If our regulatory
proposal were implemented, then the CFTC would have additional responsibilities. Accord-
ingly, Congress may want to consider increasing the CFTC budget to cover the additional
costs of administration and enforcement.
The taxonomy we offer for the CFTC to claim jurisdiction over an information market
contract is designed with two features in mind: ﬁrst, to avoid having the CFTC regulate those
contractsthatareakintogamblingandservenoeconomicpurpose;andsecond,toencourage
the development of information markets that could be economically beneﬁcial.
79 See CFTC Guideline 1.59 (b)(1)(i): “Each self-regulatory organization must maintain in effect rules which
have been submitted to the Commission pursuant to Section 5a(a)(12)(A) of the Act…that at a minimum,
prohibit: (i) Employees of the self-regulatory organization from: (A) Trading, directly or indirectly, in any
commodity interest traded on or cleared by the employing contract market or clearing organization.”
80 See the Commodity Exchange Act, §2 (D)(i): “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission shall have jurisdiction and authority over security futures…(I) Except as
otherwise provided in a rule, regulation, or order…any security underlying the security future, including each
component security of a narrow-based security index, is registered pursuant to section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.” For the statute that addresses jurisdiction over insider trading, see the Commodity
Exchange Act §2 (D)(i) (VII): “The board of trade on which the security futures product is traded has pro-
cedures in place for coordinated surveillance among such board of trade, any market on which any security
underlying the securities futures product is traded, and any other markets on which any related security is
traded to detect manipulation and insider trading, except that, if the board of trade is an alternative trading
system, a national securities association registered pursuant to section 15A(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 or national securities exchange registered pursuant to section 6(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 of which such alternative trading system is a member has in place such procedures.”
81 In 1974, Congress amended the Commodity Exchange Act by expanding the deﬁnition of a futures con-
tract to encompass virtually any commodity, tangible or intangible. See Commodity Exchange Act, Sec. 1a [7
U.S.C. 1a] Deﬁnitions, (4): (“The term ‘commodity’ means wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye…and
all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt
with”.) See also United States General Accounting Ofﬁce (1997), at 5 (“The list of speciﬁed commodities
was expanded to include “all goods and articles…and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt with”.)
82 For example, Congress could deﬁne the word “commodity” in such a way as to include certain kinds of
commodities that would serve as useful information markets. Examples might include weather and economic
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EveniftherearesomesocialcostsattachedtoinformationmarketcontractsthattheCFTC
regulates, we believe there are likely to be considerable offsetting beneﬁts. These include
improvementsinpublicpolicy,hedgingagainstrisk,andeconomicdecisionsthatresultfrom
the increased use of information markets. Unlike information markets, Internet gambling
does not have these social beneﬁts.
While it is difﬁcult to quantify the potential beneﬁts of introducing information markets
more rapidly, there are number of ways this might be accomplished. First, one could have
an information market related to the economic impact of a potential change in CFTC policy,
for example on the volume of trading in information markets. One could also measure the
dollar trading volume in information markets before and after regulation.
Unfortunately, volume is an imperfect proxy for the beneﬁts from hedging because some
traders will undoubtedly trade for speculative reasons. A better measure of hedging beneﬁts
wouldinvolvedirectlyestimatingtheimpactofindividuals’portfoliosofinformationmarket
contracts on the variance in their overall incomes.83 Survey data could be used to assess the
magnitude of this hedging beneﬁt.84
There would also be beneﬁts from the information provided by the prices in information
markets. These would include improved economic and policy decisions, but would be harder
to measure. One statistical test could examine the average economic beneﬁts from policy
decisions before and after information markets were introduced. An alternative test could
compare the economic beneﬁts from policy decisions relying heavily on information market
prices to the beneﬁts from decisions that did not rely on information market prices.
We believe the beneﬁts of our proposal are likely to outweigh the costs for three rea-
sons. First, the proposal is designed to facilitate the introduction of information markets that
improve economic decision making, and thus result in signiﬁcant economic beneﬁts. Sec-
ond, there may be modest cost savings associated with having a single federal regulatory
agency oversee regulation of economically important information markets, rather than the
current system in which many state regulators are involved. Finally, we believe the costs of
our proposal, in terms of increased gambling, are likely to be small.85
5. Conclusion
Information markets have a great deal of potential to inform private and public decisions.
Whether this potential is realized will depend in part on the regulatory environment in which
these markets operate. Currently there are a number of laws and regulations in the United
States that discourage the emergence of potentially useful information markets. These mar-
kets are now subject to the same Internet gambling laws that are used to regulate Internet
card games. We think this situation needs to be rectiﬁed. The federal government should
83 See Athanasoulis, Shiller, and Wincoop (1999). (“Shiller and Schneider (1998), using 1968–1987 U.S.
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, estimate the variance of income changes that are not under
the control of individuals…The results show that between half and three-quarters of the variance of ﬁve-year
income changes can be explained by the aggregate indexes. Most of people’s income risk could therefore be
managed through macro markets, assuming that they were opened not just on national incomes but, within
that, on occupational incomes.”) See, e.g., Shiller and Schneider (1998). See also Athanasoulis and Shiller
(2001).
84 For example, one could use the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
85 Consumers who suffer from gambling addictions already have a large number of ways to gamble. We
doubt that adding the kind of information markets discussed here would add substantially to the externalities
associated with gambling.280 J Regul Econ (2006) 29:265–281
implement a clear policy that allows information markets that serve a useful economic pur-
pose. In our view, the CFTC can, and should, do this now. If not, Congress should change
the law to allow the CFTC to regulate such contracts.
We have offered a modest regulatory proposal that would place the primary responsibility
for regulating economically useful information markets with the CFTC. The proposal would
require a demonstration that speciﬁc information contracts be likely to provide ﬁnancial
hedging opportunities or useful information for improving economic decisions. Our pro-
posal provides a clear policy for regulating information market contracts that could have
desirable economic characteristics. Moreover, our proposal is also designed to exclude con-
tracts that could have negative consequences, such as sports betting. We think the modest
potentialdownsideriskassociatedwithourproposalismorethanoffsetbythepotentialgains
that could result from more widespread use of information markets.
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